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A CASE AGAINST CLOSURE 
Doris Olin* 
SÍNTESE – Este artigo examina a objeção ao
fechamento [dedutivo] que surge no contexto de
certos paradoxos epistêmicos, paradoxos cuja
conclusão é que a crença justificada pode ser
inconsistente. É universalmente aceito que, se 
essa conclusão é correta, o fechamento deve ser
rejeitado, para que se evite a crença justificada
em enunciados contraditórios (P,  ~P). Mas,
mesmo que os argumentos desses paradoxos – o 
paradoxo da falibilidade (do prefácio) e o parado-
xo da loteria – sejam mal-sucedidos, eles, ainda 
assim, sugerem a existência de evidência inde-
pendente para uma objeção mais direta contra o
fechamento. O exame do argumento da falibilida-
de revela uma exigência de modéstia epistêmica
que viola o fechamento a partir de múltiplas 
premissas. A reflexão sobre o paradoxo da loteria
nos confronta com um dilema em que cada
alternativa fornece um contra-exemplo ao fecha-
mento a partir de uma única premissa. Seja ou
não possível a inconsistência racional, há uma 
objeção contra o fechamento. 
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Falibilidade. Paradoxo da Loteria. Paradoxo do
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ABSTRACT – This paper examines the case 
against closure that arises in the context of 
certain epistemic paradoxes, paradoxes whose 
conclusion is that it is possible for justified belief 
to be inconsistent. It is generally agreed that if 
this conclusion is correct, closure must be 
rejected in order to avoid justified belief in 
contradictory statements (P, ~P). But even if the 
arguments of these paradoxes – the fallibility 
(preface) paradox and the lottery paradox – are 
unsuccessful, they nonetheless suggest 
independent grounds for a more direct case 
against closure. Examination of the fallibility 
argument reveals a requirement of epistemic 
modesty that violates multiple premise closure. 
Reflection on the lottery paradox presents us with 
a dilemma in which each alternative provides a 
counterexample to single premise closure. 
Whether or not rational inconsistency is possible,
there is a case against closure. 
KEY WORDS – Closure. Fallibility. Lottery 
paradox. Preface paradox. Justification. 
Inconsistency. 
 
I 
The principle of epistemic closure, according to which knowledge and justifica-
tion of belief extend over known implication, is currently under attack from several 
quarters. Recent discussions of scepticism, for instance, have targeted the closure 
principle as the villain in the traditional sceptical argument, and have thus focused 
on discrediting the notion that knowledge is always closed under logical implica-
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tion.
1 Closure has also been under siege in connection with two epistemic para-
doxes, paradoxes whose conclusion is that justified belief can be inconsistent. If this 
conclusion is correct, then we are faced with an apparent consequence that seems 
clearly unacceptable, namely, that belief in contradictory statements (P, ∼P) can be 
reasonable. To escape this consequence, many have rejected certain versions of the 
closure principle.
2 
In this paper, I examine only one aspect of the case against closure, specifically, 
that which arises in the context of the two epistemic paradoxes concerning inconsis-
tency – the fallibility (preface) paradox and the lottery paradox. Even if their arguments 
for justified inconsistency are not successful – I think they are not – and therefore do 
not require the denial of closure to avoid justified belief in contradictions, they none-
theless suggest other considerations that provide a more direct case against closure. 
The intuitive appeal of closure lies in the sense that in a valid argument, the 
epistemic status of the premises extends to the conclusion. Precise formulations of 
this intuitively plausible thesis in the literature vary along at least two parameters. 
One standard version of closure is formulated in terms of knowledge: If S knows that 
P, and P implies Q, then S knows that Q. Another version pertains to justification: If 
S is justified in believing P, and P implies Q, then S is justified in believing Q. My 
interest here is in the latter principle, which is arguably more fundamental. Both 
versions, however, require restriction, for there are logical consequences of your 
justified beliefs (knowledge) which are complex or distant, and of which you are 
quite unaware. Thus, a more defensible formulation in terms of justification is: 
Closure: If S is justified in believing P, and knows that P implies Q, then S is justified 
in believing Q. 
A second dimension along which closure principles may vary concerns the 
number of premises allowed in the deduction. The version just enunciated allows 
just one premise P; call this ‘Single Premise Closure’ (SPC). A stronger variant is 
Multiple Premise Closure (MPC): 
Multiple Premise Closure: If S is justified in believing P1, …, Pn, and knows that P1, …, Pn 
jointly imply Q, then S is justified in believing Q. 
(MPC), of course, implies (SPC), but not conversely. Note that both (SPC) and 
(MPC) are expressed in terms of what the subject is justified in believing, as op-
posed to what she justifiably believes.
3 To say that a subject S is justified in be-
lieving P does not imply that S in fact believes P and, therefore, does not imply 
that she justifiably believes P. ‘S is justified in believing P’, as here understood, 
implies only that S is evidentially in a position to justifiably believe P. 
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This formulation of the closure principles reflects the intuition that what one 
may justifiably believe extends over known implication. But there are situations in 
which recognition of what is entailed by your justified belief P should, rationally, 
lead you to give up the belief in P. This does not, however, necessitate any revi-
sion or qualification of our closure principles. For the advocate of closure can 
maintain that if S comes to see that P implies Q, and Q is clearly unacceptable 
given S’s total evidence, then P is no longer justified for S. It is understood that 
each of the relevant clauses refers to the same time, that is: if S knows at t that P 
implies Q, and, at t, Q is clearly unacceptable given S’s total evidence, then P is 
not justified for S at t. Similarly, each clause in a closure principle must be under-
stood to refer to the same time. 
Finally, it is instructive to compare our version of closure with two other 
closely related principles. Consider: 
Transmission of Evidential Support (TES): If E is evidence for P, and P implies Q, then 
E is evidence for Q. 
Those who accept (TES) will likely find the following plausible: 
Transmission of Justification (TJ): If S is justified in believing P, and knows that P im-
plies Q, then S is justified in believing Q on the basis of P.
 4 
(TJ) makes a claim as to how Q is justified; Q is justified on the basis of P, which 
is itself justified. This is in contrast to the closure principles above, which leave it 
an open question how Q is justified. 
Neither of the two Transmission principles, however, stands up to scrutiny. 
Suppose I justifiably believe 
P: Cynthia will watch television the entire evening on Wednesday. 
based on her announced intention to do so; and it is clear to me that P implies 
Q: There will not be a power failure on Wednesday evening. 
Now consider, first, the Transmission of Evidential Support principle. Note that my 
evidence that Cynthia will watch television on Wednesday evening, Cynthia’s 
announced intention, is clearly not evidence that there will not be a power failure 
on Wednesday evening. So the evidence for P is not evidence for Q. Turning to the 
Transmission of Justification, my belief that Q can hardly be justified on the basis 
of my belief that P. For one thing, there is the fact that the evidence for P is not 
evidence for Q. But there is a more decisive consideration. That Cynthia’s expres-
sion of intent provides adequate evidence to justify me in believing P is contingent 
on my being entitled to take for granted the truth of Q, or to ignore the possibility 
that Q is false. That being so, I can hardly appeal to P to justify a belief that Q. 
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That is, P cannot serve as the evidence which justifies me in believing Q.
5 There 
are relations of epistemic priority or ordering that are not captured in either the 
transmission or closure principles, but which pose a problem only for transmission. 
More intriguing examples of this will emerge later in the discussion. 
II 
The context for this examination of closure is the possibility of justified inconsis-
tent belief. Two main arguments for the rationality of inconsistency can be distin-
guished in the literature: (i) the fallibility paradox (which is a more general version of 
the preface paradox) and (ii) the lottery paradox. Let us begin with the fallibility 
paradox. The key fact on which it is based is that we are fallible in that we have 
often discovered error in our justified beliefs, beliefs based on the data of perception, 
testimony, memory and so on. If I have often discovered error in my justified beliefs 
formed by method M in the past, then it seems plausible to infer that there is error 
in my present justified beliefs formed by the same method. But my present justified 
beliefs are P1, ..., Pn; so I am also entitled to believe ∼(P1& ... &Pn).
6, 7 Thus I am justi-
fied in believing inconsistent statements. 
Note that in order to have justified belief in an inconsistency, I must work 
through the steps in the argument; for instance, I must be justified in believing that 
there was error in my past justified beliefs, and must make the inference to error in 
my present justified beliefs. In particular, I must be justified in believing that my 
present justified beliefs are P1, ..., Pn. This is a strong and unrealistic requirement; it 
is arguable that none of us has the appropriate justified belief. Nevertheless, it seems 
epistemically possible that a rational being should have such a belief. So the argu-
ment can be construed as establishing at least that it is epistemically possible to 
have justified inconsistent belief. 
What is the impact of the fallibility argument on closure? Grant that a set of in-
consistent statements can be shown to imply contradictory statements, that is, state-
ments of the form: P, ∼P. Thus, if justified belief in inconsistent statements is possible, 
so, it would seem, is justified belief in a contradiction. But for the vast majority of 
philosophers, the notion of contradictory justified beliefs is anathema. To escape from 
this apparent embarrassing consequence, the proponent of justified inconsistency is 
forced to deny Multiple Premise Closure (MPC). Nor is this the only cost of sanctioning 
inconsistency. If Single Premise Closure (SPC) is to be retained, we must also reject: 
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Conjunction Principle (CP): If S is justified in believing P, and S is justified in believing 
Q, then S is justified in believing P&Q. 
For (CP) combined with (SPC) has the logical force of (MPC).
8 Thus, the cost of 
granting the fallibility argument for inconsistency is that two closure principles, 
(MPC) and (CP), must be rejected. (SPC), however, may be retained. 
I believe that the fallibility argument is flawed.
9 Very briefly: The fallibility 
argument moves from errors in past beliefs to errors in the present set of beliefs 
formed by the same method. That a method of belief formation has led to error 
in the past indicates that the evidence employed is not perfectly reliable. This 
means that an air-tight connection with truth is absent; but it does not follow 
that there is a reliable, projectible connection with falsity. For instance, reading 
tea leaves is a method of belief formation that has certainly led to error in the 
past. Suppose that present tea leaf readings have led, via a standard method of 
interpretation, to a set of statements about the future, R1, ..., Rn. If the fact of the 
tea leaf readings constitutes reason to think there is error in the set of Ris, that 
is, to think ∼(R1& ... &Rn) is true, then it appears that tea leaf reading can pro-
vide reason for beliefs about the future (since the negation of the conjunction of 
the Ris is a statement about the future).
10 But this seems absurd. If, on the other 
hand, facts about tea leaf reading are simply irrelevant to the truth or falsity of 
the Ris, as we normally think, then the key inference in the fallibility argument 
seems illegitimate. 
Still, even if defective, the argument invites us to consider what each of us 
should believe about her first order beliefs.
11 We are admittedly fallible creatures; 
our beliefs frequently contain error, not just our careless or irresponsible beliefs, 
but even our perfectly reasonable beliefs. Recognition of our fallibility, in this 
sense, surely warrants some degree of epistemic modesty. Perhaps it is going 
too far to say that we should believe that there is error in our present first order 
justified beliefs. But at the least, we ought not to believe that all our first order 
justified beliefs are true, that is, we should withhold belief on the matter. This 
seems the minimal requirement of epistemic modesty. 
Even this moderate response, however, has repercussions for closure. Con-
sider the statement that all beliefs of a certain sort are true; it seems clear that this 
is not equivalent, as is sometimes assumed, to the conjunction of the beliefs of 
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that sort.
12 If A, B and C are all the beliefs of type Φ, I may believe the conjunction 
A&B&C without believing that all beliefs of type Φ are true; for I may not realize 
that A, B and C are all the type Φ beliefs. The following, however, seems a valid 
argument: 
Argument α   (1) A, B, C 
(2) The beliefs of type Φ are: A, B, C. 
(3) So all the beliefs of type Φ are true. 
(Note that (1) expresses three distinct premises.) Now suppose that P1, … , P n are 
T’s present first order justified beliefs. If argument α is valid, then so is argument 
β as follows: 
Argument β   (1) P1, ..., Pn. 
(2) T’s present first order justified beliefs are: P1, ..., Pn. 
(3) Therefore, all T’s present first order justified beliefs are true. 
Given the validity of argument β, if T is justified in believing the premises of the 
argument, and sees that the premises imply the conclusion, she should, by (MPC), 
be justified in believing the conclusion. It is a given that she is justified in believ-
ing the statements P1, ..., Pn. As noted earlier, one is not normally justified in be-
lieving a statement such as (2), but it is epistemically possible that one should be. 
Assuming that T is so justified, and sees the validity of the argument, (MPC) war-
rants her in accepting (3); that is, (MPC) warrants her in holding a belief that epis-
temic modesty prohibits. If our sense of modesty prevails, then a counterexample 
to (MPC) has been described. A situation that is epistemically possible (although 
perhaps rarely or never actual) provides an instance of a failure of (MPC).
13 Thus, 
(MPC) cannot be considered a sound epistemic principle. 
There are other putative counterexamples to (MPC) in the literature, of course. 
Many have a structure similar to that of the preface/fallibility scenario. First, a list 
of n statements, each of which one is apparently justified in believing, is specified; 
there seems no reason to prefer any one statement on the list to any other. Then 
counterevidence is provided that there is (at least) one false statement on the list, 
with no indication as to which statement it is that is false. This provides the basis 
for an apparent counterexample to (MPC) in a variety of ways. For instance, the 
set consisting of the first n-1 statements on the list, plus the claim that one of the 
statements on the list is false, implies that the nth statement is false; but it seems 
absurd to suppose that one is justified in believing that the nth statement is false.
14 
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A general difficulty with examples of this sort, examples having the pref-
ace/fallibility structure, is that they involve two distinct lines of evidence: the 
evidence for the statements on the list, and the counterevidence that (at least) one 
statement on the list is false. Thus there is need to adjudicate competing claims: 
perhaps the counterevidence outweighs the evidence for the statements on the 
list, so that none of those statements is justified; or perhaps the evidence for the 
statements on the list is sufficiently strong to outweigh the counterevidence. Some 
further argument as to how these distinct bodies of evidence combine is necessary 
to achieve a clear counterexample to (MPC). This is not an issue with the epis-
temic modesty example, of course, since it has an entirely different structure. 
Clearly, (MPC) is the stronger of the two closure principles, and is thus more 
vulnerable; (SPC) is untouched by this discussion. But a more sweeping attack on 
closure is found in the context of the lottery paradox, to which I now turn. 
III 
The lottery paradox rests on one key philosophical premise, the Principle of 
High Probability, which can be stated as follows: 
(HP) There is a number n (n<1) such that if P has probability of at least n for S, then S 
is justified in believing P. 
Suppose a fair lottery with exactly 1,000 tickets, of which one will be drawn. The 
probability that ticket 1 will lose is .999. Given (HP), it seems reasonable to think 
that a probability of .999 is sufficient to warrant belief. So I am entitled to believe 
T1 (Ticket 1 will lose). Similarly for T2, T3, and so on; I am entitled to believe each 
Ti. But I am also entitled to believe that exactly one ticket will win. So I am justi-
fied in believing each of: 
T1, ..., T1,000, ∼(T1&T2 ... &T1,000) 
But this is an inconsistent set. Thus I am justified in holding inconsistent beliefs. 
The success or failure of this second argument for rational inconsistency rides 
on the issue whether the Tis are justified or not. Of course, I can believe that it is 
highly likely that ticket x won’t win; but am I entitled to believe, simply, ticket x 
won’t win? Note that there is an apparent difference in my cognitive attitude to 
ticket x losing in lottery L1, after I read in the newspaper that some other ticket won, 
as compared to my attitude to ticket x losing in another lottery L2, before the draw 
has taken place. But in what can this difference consist? One plausible account is 
that I believe ticket x is a loser in the first case; while in the second, I believe just 
that it is highly probable that ticket x is a loser.
15 
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While suggestive, the above is hardly definitive. Recently, however, there has 
been a flurry of debate on the epistemic status of lottery statements, in the course 
of which examples have been produced that may have significance for the para-
dox and for closure.
16 The focus of the debate has been knowledge and lottery 
statements; here it will be transposed to justification and lottery statements. 
Suppose that Bernard owes a considerable sum of money. He has no invest-
ments, and no sources of income other than his salary. After a thorough review of 
his financial situation, he believes, justifiably, that he will not be able to pay off his 
debt in the next month. Surely, we all have beliefs of this sort, beliefs that are fully 
justified. As it happens, Bernard also owns a ticket in a Super-Lotto in which the 
draw has yet to occur. Bernard is aware that winning the prize in the Super-Lotto 
would make him a fabulously wealthy man; paying off his debt next month would 
be a triviality. Does it not follow that Bernard must be warranted in believing that 
he will not win the lottery? Do we not have to grant this in order to make sense of 
the fact that Bernard is justified in believing that he will not be able to pay off his 
debt next month? But if Bernard is entitled to believe he will not win the lottery, 
then surely the Tis in any lottery are warranted. 
This and related examples might seem to clinch the case for rational belief 
in the Tis, and thereby for the possibility of rational inconsistency, since it is 
unquestionable that we sometimes justifiably believe that we will not be able to 
pay off a debt (or afford a trip to Bermuda) despite knowing that we have a 
ticket in a lottery in which the draw has not yet occurred. It would be entirely 
premature, however, to concede the point; for it is possible to make a similar 
case that belief in the Tis is not warranted. 
The argument might run as follows. Suppose a terrorist group decides that a 
certain public official must be assassinated. One member of the group is to do 
the deed, but there are compelling reasons why the agent should be selected 
randomly from within the group. A lottery, whose results will be kept secret, is 
held to determine which person will be assigned the task; the person holding 
the ‘winning’ ticket will do the deed. The assassination, we may suppose, takes 
place according to plan. Now consider Max, a typical member of the terrorist 
group. Surely, we are not entitled to believe, without independent evidence, that 
Max is not the assassin.
17 But if Max did not win the lottery, then Max is not the 
assassin. We know that losing the lottery is a sufficient condition for not being 
the killer. Does it not follow, then, that we are not entitled to believe that Max 
lost the lottery? If so, surely the Tis in any given lottery are not warranted on 
purely statistical grounds. 
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So here are two highly intuitive, structurally similar arguments for opposing 
conclusions. Are we, or are we not, justified in believing the Tis on purely statisti-
cal grounds? We need to examine the two cases more closely.
18 
The key statements in the first example are: 
(A)   (1) Bernard will not be able to pay off his debt next month. 
(2) If Bernard wins the lottery, then he will be able to pay off his debt next month. 
(3) Bernard will not win the lottery. 
The corresponding statements in the second case are: 
(B)   (1*) Max did not win the lottery. 
(2*) If Max did not win the lottery, then he was not the assassin. 
(3*) Max was not the assassin. 
Those who accept the argument of the lottery paradox (call them ‘the reformers’) 
can argue that since we are entitled to accept (1), we must also be entitled to 
accept (3). Those who do not sanction rational inconsistency (‘the traditionalists’), 
on the other hand, can maintain that since (3*) is not warranted, neither is (1*). 
Consider (A) and (B) as arguments, with (3) and (3*) as conclusions, respec-
tively. A key difference between the two arguments is that one has a lottery state-
ment as conclusion, while the other has a lottery statement as a premise. But, 
clearly, both arguments are valid. The reformer argues that since (A) is valid, and 
the premises are justified, then so must be the conclusion. But this presupposes a 
closure principle, specifically (MPC). The traditionalist claims, on the other hand, 
that since argument (B) is valid, and (2*) is warranted while (3*) is not, it must be 
the case that (1*) is not warranted. Again, (MPC) is assumed. 
But it cannot be that both the reformer and the traditionalist are right. It cannot 
be that (3) is warranted, while (1*) is not, for we have exactly the same sort of statis-
tical evidence for each (we can even make the size of the lotteries the same). Here is 
it is important to be clear on a point discussed earlier: That we are justified in be-
lieving statements that imply P does not guarantee that those statements can serve 
as our justification for P. For instance, we believe that (i) Barbara will be in New 
York on Wednesday (based on her announced intention to travel there for an inter-
view); we also believe that (ii) if Barbara were to win the lottery, she would stay in 
Toronto on Wednesday to receive the prize. But we cannot, in this situation, appeal 
to (i) and (ii) to justify (iii) Barbara will not win the lottery. Similarly, in argument (A), 
premises (1) and (2) do not, and cannot, constitute our evidence for (3); we cannot 
justify our belief that Bernard won’t win the lottery on the basis of our belief that he 
won’t be able to pay his debt next month, and winning the lottery would enable him 
to do so. For one thing, our evidence for (1) and (2), facts about Bernard’s current 
financial situation, and about the size of the lottery award, do not constitute evi-
dence that Bernard will not win the lottery. But a more decisive consideration is that 
our being justified in believing Bernard won’t be able to pay his debt next month is 
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contingent on the epistemic status of (3) for us: we must either be justified in believ-
ing (3), or justified in ignoring the possibility that (3) is false. So we can hardly ap-
peal to (1) and (2) to justify (3). Consequently, the only evidence we have which 
might serve to justify (3) is the statistical data concerning the lottery. 
(An aside: It is worth noting that this feature of the examples does not persist 
through all variations. If we change the Barbara/New York example so that the 
relevant events are in the past, then we can have a different sort of evidence for 
the first premise. Thus we might have: (i*) Barbara was in New York on Wednes-
day (based on our having seen her there) (ii*) if Barbara had won the lottery, she 
would have stayed in Toronto on Wednesday (iii*) Barbara didn’t win the lottery. 
Here justified belief in (i*) and (ii*) can provide the grounds for (iii*). For in the past 
tense version in which we see Barbara in New York, the justification for (i*) is not 
contingent on the epistemic status of (iii*).) 
To return to the argument. In the situation envisioned, there is the same evi-
dence for (3) and (1*), that is, the statistical information. So either both (3) and (1*) 
are warranted, or neither is. Let us consider each side of the dilemma. If (3) and 
(1*) are both warranted, it still seems clear that (3*) is not; and the only way to 
make room for this fact is to deny (MPC). Suppose, on the other hand, that neither 
(3) nor (1*) is warranted. Then the only way to accommodate the fact that (3) is 
not warranted is to deny (MPC). The conclusion that (MPC) does not hold seems 
inescapable. 
What is worse, (SPC) also seems vulnerable to this argument. Start with the 
dilemma: either (3) and (1*) are both justified, or neither is. Suppose the first pos-
sibility holds; then (1*) and (2*) are each individually justified. If the conjunction of 
(1*) and (2*) is also justified, as seems highly plausible, then argument (B) can be 
restated as one-premise argument and, as such, provides a counter-example to 
(SPC). Suppose, on the other hand, that neither (3) nor (1*) is individually war-
ranted. In argument (A), (1) and (2) are each individually justified. If the conjunc-
tion of (1) and (2) is warranted, then argument (A) can be restated as a one-
premise argument in which the premise is warranted, and the conclusion is not. 
Again, there is an apparent counter-example to (SPC). 
Whether the argument has repercussions for (SPC) depends on whether it is 
plausible to maintain that one of the conjunctions is not justified, despite the fact 
that each of its conjuncts is. Clearly, this is not guaranteed even assuming (CP) 
fails. The most plausible counterexamples to (CP) are lengthy, informative and 
highly detailed conjunctions that might be regarded as having low probability. But 
to protect (SPC) from the argument above requires that we deny that a very mod-
est conjunction is justified: either the conjunction (1)&(2) (if the lottery statements 
are not justified) or (1*)&(2*) (if the lottery statements are justified). It is hard to see 
why such modest conjunctions would not be justified. It appears, then, that if the 
argument succeeds against (MPC), it also overturns (SPC). 
The key step in the argument is the dilemma: 
Either (3) and (1*) are both justified or neither is.   245
But does this dilemma really hold? One might object to it on the grounds that 
justification is not straightforwardly a function of the strength of the evidence; 
rather, justification is context-sensitive in that the degree of evidence required for 
justification varies with the context. One possibility worth considering is that the 
standards of evidence are a function of the seriousness or significance of the con-
clusion inferred from the evidence. If this is so, then it can plausibly be argued 
that the standards of justification will differ in the two cases, the debtor and the 
assassin; specifically, more will be required in the case of (1*) because the ques-
tion of whether Max won the lottery is known to be directly relevant to whether 
Max is the assassin – a highly significant issue. 
Is it possible to escape the dilemma in this way? It has been suggested that 
(3) can be warranted while (1*) is not, despite our having the same evidence for 
each. The grounds for (3) are that exactly one of the n tickets in the lottery will 
win; so (3) can be warranted only if such purely statistical information can con-
stitute good evidence. But if this is so, the larger the lottery, the stronger the 
evidence for a given lottery statement. Consequently, the strength of the evi-
dence for (1*) can be increased just by increasing the size of the lottery. So we 
should be able to achieve whatever level of evidence is necessary to justify (1*) 
simply by adjusting the size of the lottery appropriately.
19 We can maintain the 
parallel between (3) and (1*), then, even though we grant that (1*) requires 
stronger evidence, just by increasing the size of the lottery in the assassin case. 
Thus, once the size of the lotteries has been adjusted, there is no longer any 
basis for maintaining that (3) can be justified while (1*) is not. Finally, note that 
increasing the size of the lottery has no significant impact on the Max example; 
it remains clear that (3*) is not warranted. 
There is still a further move, however, for those who try to evade the di-
lemma on the grounds that justification is context-sensitive. The proposal we 
have been considering, it might now be suggested, must be further refined as 
follows: (1*) requires stronger evidence in the sense that it requires a better kind 
of evidence than purely statistical evidence. (The testimony of a reliable eyewit-
ness, for instance, might be a better kind of evidence.) The suggestion is, then, 
that certain kinds of evidence can, in principle, provide a level of confirmation 
that purely statistical data, however strong, cannot. 
The full significance of this proposal (call it ‘(RP)’) emerges more clearly if 
we distinguish explicitly between epistemic probability, understood as the de-
gree of confirmation of a statement, and statistical probability, which is a matter 
of the relative frequency with which a given event occurs in a certain reference 
class. Suppose an epistemic probability of n is sufficient to justify (1*) in the Max 
story. According to (RP), purely statistical data, however strong, does not suf-
fice; so a statistical probability of n does not yield an epistemic probability of n. 
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The argument of the lottery paradox, however, moves implicitly from a statistical 
probability of α to an epistemic probability of α. According to the current pro-
posal, this move is illegitimate. So a consequence of the revised proposal, then, 
is that the implicit reasoning of the lottery is fallacious, and the lottery argu-
ment, in its usual formulation, does not go through. 
What is the impact of the revised proposal on the case against closure? On 
the negative side, (RP) seems ad hoc, seems specifically designed to stop the 
anti-closure argument. Why should it be the case that statistical probability is a 
source of epistemic probability, but yet there is an upper limit on the degree of 
confirmation it can yield? If statistical data can never yield a degree of confirma-
tion of n, perhaps this is better explained by maintaining that statistical data 
alone can never be a source of epistemic probability
20 – in which case, neither 
(3) nor (1*) is warranted, and the dilemma holds. 
I am sceptical about (RP). But I do not see a clear refutation of the proposal; 
nor can I demonstrate that a theory according to which statistical probability is 
simply not a source of confirmation is preferable to (RP). In fact, there is some 
plausibility to the notion that one kind of evidence can, in principle, achieve hi-
gher degrees of confirmation than another.
21 Some might take this to be true, for 
instance, of direct perceptual evidence as compared to the evidence of memory. 
Nor does the proposal conflict with the idea that increasingly higher statistical 
probability yields increasingly higher epistemic probability; for it may be that the 
degree of confirmation provided by statistical data continues to increase, but ap-
proaches a limit m (m<n, where n is the degree of confirmation required by (1*)). 
The upshot is that, insofar as (RP) is a live option, the present argument 
against closure must be revised so that there is no disparity between the two 
cases, so that they involve issues of roughly equal significance. There are two 
options here: make the example in (A) weightier, or make the example in (B) 
less weighty. The first option is the simplest: we add to the Bernard story that 
he will be hunted by the mob if he cannot pay his debts in the next month. Now 
both (3) and (1*) are connected to highly significant issues; and the premises of 
(A) are still warranted. To take the second option, we can revise the Max story 
so that the issues are not as momentous. Suppose Max belongs to a group of 
teenagers who want to establish a reputation for being cool. They decide to 
commit a minor act of vandalism: scratch the door of a car with a key. A lottery 
is held to determine who in the group will do it, and the ‘winner’ of the lottery 
does the deed. Now neither (3) nor (1*) is connected to momentous issues; and 
it seems clear that the conclusion of (B) is not warranted. Whichever of these 
two options for revising the examples is chosen, the dilemma seems to hold. 
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I have considered above the objections to the dilemma that seem most plau-
sible. Others may find further avenues to explore in assessing the dilemma and its 
implications for closure. Two points, however, should be kept in mind: First, any 
approach designed to save closure must grant that lottery statements can be justi-
fied on the basis of purely statistical evidence; otherwise (A) provides a counter-
example to closure. Second, as long as the only ground for belief is the statistical 
information concerning the lottery, (3*) does not seem to be justified. 
In sum: Even if the arguments for the rationality of inconsistency fail, they 
suggest independent grounds for the denial of closure. Consideration of the pref-
ace and fallibility arguments exposes a requirement of epistemic modesty that 
conflicts with the dictates of (MPC). Reflection on the lottery scenario, on the 
other hand, gives rise to a dilemma in which each alternative seems to provide a 
counterexample to (SPC). Whether or not rational inconsistency is possible, there 
is a case against closure.
22 
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